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A b s t r a c t
A failed bank can spark a deep financial crisis throughout the whole country when ironically it may
simply have been triggered by a banking crime perpetrated by an insider, i.e. the banker. Although
banking crimes may pose a significant threat to financial sector stability, the potential risk of internal
fraud has, hitherto, not been taken into account in banking supervision processes. This paper analyzes
the effectiveness of banking supervision to uncover potential risks of banking crimes by combining game
theory and the analytical network process approach. In this paper, the author conducts two games with
three players; the banker, the bank supervisor and the police. The banker has two strategies: to offend or
not to offend. The bank supervisor has two choices: to supervise or not to supervise. The police can
choose to enforce or not to enforce. In the first part, the effectiveness of bank supervision is analyzed
theoretically using game theory. The effectiveness of banking supervision will depend on the behavior of
each player as reflected in their decisions. Further analysis will confirm the previous result using an analytical
network process. At this stage, the analytical network process is used to calculate the probability of each
strategy being chosen by considering all criteria or sub criteria. Any decision made by one player will
influence the other players in choosing their alternative strategies and vice versa.
JEL Classificiation: C78, E58
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade a number of countries experienced severe crises detrimental
not only to their financial systems but also the regional economy as a whole. From 2008
until now, the global economy has survived extreme turbulence. Gauging the recent global
crisis against all others in recorded history, the current turmoil probably ranks as the most
significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude may vary depending critically on the government»s
policy response, particularly through recapitalizing the banking system to restore stability
and confidence.
In most cases of financial crisis, the banking sector has always played a prominent role.
Often the dominating sector in an economy, the banking sector either triggers a crisis or
exacerbates the situation. Considering its staggering effect, banking resilience is the pivotal
first line of defense to protect the economy. Based on that same logic, bank recovery is the
most determining step in any financial crisis resolution. For instance, in the current global
financial crisis almost all developed countries are relying on bank recovery to bring the crisis to
an end.
Many scholars and bankers are acutely aware of the problem with banking sector fragility.
After the 1997 Asian Crisis, risk-based banking supervision was introduced and implemented.
Despite stricter regulations, the problems with banking over the last decade indicated that not
enough safeguards were put in place to avoid a banking crisis.
The current banking supervision mechanism does not sufficiently take into account the
actions of individual bank employees as a risk factor when ironically some cases of troubled
banks were attributable to a banking crime perpetrated by an insider, i.e. the banker.  Barings
Bank for instance √ one of the oldest and leading banks in England √ collapsed simply as a
result of speculative activities by its manager. In Japan, Daiwa Bank, one of the largest banks in
the country, was bancrupted because of a single internal fraudulent act.   If the banker adopts
risk-seeking or even greedy behavior, the banking sector therefore contains a potentially high
risk of internal fraud. As a consequence, despite the continued strengthening of banking
supervision, the probability of a banking crisis caused by a single banking crime remains high.
II. THEORY
To anticipate or lessen the likelihood of bank failure, we need analysis tools to identify
banking problems from a different perspective. Most available analysis tools used to determine
the factors of a banking crisis, and subsequently compile resolution programs, overlook internal
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fraud as a cause for concern. Those analyses primarily focus on external factors such as market
and credit risks. The lessons learned from numerous cases of banking problems show us that
internal factors like risk-seeking or greedy behavior at certain levels should not be tolerated.
Risk-seeking or greedy behavior by bankers should be taken into account as a factor that may
increase the probability of banking crime and, furthermore, may cause bank failure or even
worse, a banking crisis.
Banking crime is a criminal act and to analyze the banking crime phenomena we can
adopt the economic model pioneered by Gary S. Becker3. By using a decision-making approach
Becker models the economics of a crime as follows (Becker, 1968):
Where:
EUj  =  expected utility from the crime
pj     =  probability of conviction
fj      =  monetary equivalent of punishment from given offense
Yj     =  offenders income including monetary and ≈psychic∆
Uj     =  individuals utility function
From equation (V.1), we see that the total expected utility comprises of two parts. The
first part is the probability of getting caught multiplied by the utility that will be received if
caught. It includes the monetary and non-monetary income from the activity minus the cost of
the punishment from the activity. The second part is the probability of not getting caught
multiplied by the utility from the income from the activity.  Through this equation Becker argues
that a person commits an offense if the expected utility exceeds the utility available by using
the time and other resources for other activities.
In stark contrast to Gary S. Becker, another pioneer of crime economics, George Tsebelis
(1986), argues that the occurrence probability of a crime is affected by the interactions of
rational players, i.e. the public and police. Based on this argument, Tsebelis analyzed the
economics of crime using game theory. In his model, the interaction between the public and
the police or between firms and the authorities is represented by a one-shot 2 x 2  inspection
game that is played simultaneously. The payoff matrix of the game is as follows:
3 Becker»s seminal paper (1968), ≈Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach∆, has inspired the development of crime economics.
Studies in this area have been conducted by several authors including Garoupa (1997), Bowles (2000), and Polinsky and Shavell
(2000, 2007).
(V.1)EUj = pjUj (Yj - fj) + (1 - pj)Uj(Yj)
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where: c1 > a1, b1 > d1, a2 > b2, and d2 > c2.
The game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium; instead it has a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium, which implies that punishment is not effective in influencing the tendency
of individuals from committing illegal activities. Let p be the probability of the public to offend
and q be the probability of the police to enforce the law. The mixed strategy equilibrium of the
game is as follows (theorem 1 of Tsebelis, 1989):
Through equations (V.2) and (V.3), Tsebelis argues that any attempt to increase the severity
of punishment will only alter the payoffs for individuals, namely a»1 < a1 and c1 > a»1. This policy
leaves unchanged the frequency of violation at equilibrium ( p∆). On the other hand, it decreases
the likelihood of enforcing the law (q∆). Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1992) labeled these results
as the payoff irrelevance proposition (PIP).
Tsebelis»s proposition on the in effectiveness of punishment is controversial. It has attracted
many critics. The critics primarily focus on proving that the ineffectiveness applies only in certain
conditions - for instance, if the game is played by no more than two players, if the game with
discrete payoffs is played simultaneously, or if the game is played sequentially with the public»s
move being first.
Pradiptyo (2006) modeled the phenomena in criminal justice as a 2-player 2 x  2 one-shot
game played by representative agents, namely public and enforcer. In his model, Pradiptyo
modified Tsebelis» model by replacing the police with the enforcer. Pradiptyo assumes that the
enforcer is a broader institution than the police, yet the enforcer is part of a higher organization,
namely the Criminal Justice Authority (CJA). The CJA finances the enforcer and it has the
PUBLIC
Enforce Not Enforce
Offend a1, a2 b1, b2
Not Offend c1, c2 d1, d2
THE POLICE
Table V.1. Tsebelis Inspection Games
(V.2)p* =
d2 - c2
a2 - b2 + d2 - c2
q* =
b1 - d1
b1 - d1 + c1 - a1
(V.3)
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authority to set the level of punishment. Given the punishment regime, the enforcer has the
duty of enforcing the law and delivering criminal justice intervention, including sentencing.
Furthermore, Pradiptyo modified Tsebelis» model by describing the specification of the
payoffs. In Tsebelis» model, each element of the payoffs (i.e., a, b, c and d) represents the net
benefits of choosing a strategy, given the strategy taken by the opponent. In his model, Pradiptyo
provide the identity of each element in the payoff matrix and the game is given as follows:
PUBLIC
Enforce Not Enforce
Offend U
o 
- UD, BE - CE - CS Uo + UR , O
Not Offend UR, BR - CE UR, BR
THE ENFORCER
Table V.2. Pradityo's Inspection Games
Where:
UO = immediate utility arising from committing an offence.
UD = disutility of serving direct punishment (e.g., imprisonment, fine, community service).
UR = positive reputation effects for individuals of not being convicted.
BE = benefits of enforcing the law, including the detection of incidents and any deterrence
effects that arise due to enforcement of the law.
BR = reputation benefits in achieving objectives set by the CJA.
CE = cost of law enforcement, including, for instance, costs of investigation and of
dispatching police officers to certain areas.
CS = cost of delivering court sentences, including direct and indirect punishments (e.g.,
the list of posts that cannot be taken by ex-offenders, the length of probation and
the period offenders have to report their where abouts to the police).
In his model, Pradityo argues that an individual will commit an offence if the utility to
conduct such activity dominates the expected disutility of serving direct punishment and the
expected loss of reputation. While the law will be enforced if the expected benefits of enforcing
it dominate the costs of enforcement and the expected cost of delivering sentence. These
arguments are in line with Becker»s proposition.
In addition, Pradiptyo proves in his study that both increasing the severity of the punishment
and initiating crime prevention programs may influence the offending behavior of individuals.
220 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, October 2010
The impact of the latter on reducing the probability of offending is more certain than the
former, ceteris paribus. These findings are not in line with Tsebelis» theorem.
Quite different from the crime economic analyses proposed by Tsebelis and Pradiptyo,
banking crime analysis involves three players, i.e., the banker, the police and the bank supervisor.
Bank supervision and law enforcement on banking crime can be described by the following
process:
Diagram V.1.
Banking Crime Analysis Process
The
Supervisor
The
Police
The
Banker
Case Transfer
Stage 1:
Supervisor vs Banker
Stage 2:
The Police vs The Banker
As seen in Diagram V.1 , banking crime analysis includes three players and two stages. In
the first stage we can analyze how the supervisor has to decide whether to supervise or not
supervise, while concomitantly the banker will choose between offend or not offend. If the
supervisor decided to supervise, and he/she found that the banker committed an offence, he/
she would not be able to bring the case to the court. The supervisor has to refer the case to the
police, who then (stage 2) have two alternative decisions, enforce the law or not enforce the
law. At this stage, the banker who has been arrested will have two options, try to bribe the
police, or just let the court decide whether he/she is really guilty or not and accept the
consequences.
II.1. Stage 1 of the Game: The Banker Vs The Supervisor
We model banking crime analysis stage one as a 2-player 2 x 2 one-shot game played by
representative agents, namely the banker and supervisor. It is assumed that the supervisor and
banker are individual persons. Under this assumption the supervisor has no authority to set the
level of punishment. Given the punishment regime, the supervisor has a duty to supervise and
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refer the case - if any banking crime is discovered √ to the police. This is consistent with Tsebelis»
model, which assumes that the level of punishment is exogenous, and simultaneously
accommodates Becker»s model by incorporating the allocation of resources by the supervisor in
tackling crime.
Referring to Pradiptyo (2006), the disutility of being convicted is not limited only to serving
direct punishment (e.g., paying a fine or a custodial sentence) but, more importantly, there is a
substantial reduction in potential future wealth owing to loss of reputation (we define this as a
reputation cost). In a one-shot game analysis, these reputation effects should be taken into
consideration in the model.
To set the game we adopt both Tsebelis» and»Pradiptyo»s specifications.  In Tsebelis»original
model, each element of the payoff ( i.e., a, b, c and d ) represents the net benefits of choosing
a particular strategy, given the strategy taken by the opponent. Pradiptyo refined Tsebelis»
model by providing the identity of each element in the payoff matrix. We combine Tsebelis» and
Pradiptyo»s specification and the game is given as follows:
Where:
a1 = UOB - COB - DOB - RCB
a2 = DBS - CSS + RBS
b1 = UOB - COB + RBB
b2 = - RCS
c1 = RBB
c2 = DBS-CSS+RBS
d1 = RBB
d2 = RBS
UOB = immediate utility arising from committing a fraud/banking crime.
DOB = disutility of serving direct punishment (e.g., imprisonment or fine).
COB = cost of offense arising from committing a fraud/banking crime.
RBB = positive reputation effects for banker not convicted.
BANKIR
Supervise Not Supervise
Offend a1, a2 b1, b2
Not Offend c1, c2 d1, d2
SUPERVISOR
Table V.3.
Inspection Games in Bank Supervision, stage 1
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RCB = reputation cost for convicted banker.
DBS = direct benefits of supervision, including satisfaction due to enforcement of the regulations
and bank soundness.
CSS = cost of supervising the bank, including, for instance, cost of investigation and of
dispatching police officers to certain areas.
RBS = reputation benefits in achieving the objective of bank soundness.
RCS = reputation cost for supervisors not achieving their objective.
From a banker»s perspective, committing a banking crime or fraud produces immediate
benefits (UOB), either in terms of material well-being or psychological rewards. Differing slightly
from Pradiptyo (2006), committing a banking crime is not a free-of-charge activity. To do so, a
banker has to sacrifice some of his resources including money and time as costs (COB). On the
other hand, crime produces disutility to the banker (DOB) if convicted and incarcerated. The
longer (higher) the imprisonment term (fines), the greater the disutility of serving direct
punishment (DOB). The disutility of serving direct punishment ranges from a loss of earnings to
a loss of liberty due to incarceration (Pradiptyo, 2006).
If a banker decides to offend, and the supervisors do not supervise, the banker will enjoy
the immediate utility of offending (UOB) minus its cost (COB), while keeping intact his or her
positive reputation (RBB). However, if a banker commits an offence and the supervisors supervise,
the banker will receive the immediate utility of offending (UOB) minus the cost (COB), but at the
same time, he/she will have to bear the disutility of facing direct punishment (DOB). If the
banker decides not to offend, irrespective of whether the supervisors supervise or not, he/she
will be able to maintain positive reputation effects (RBB).
Suppose an individual banker commits an offence and supervision is in place, there will
be benefits of supervising (DBS). The benefits include the ability of Supervisors to detect the
crime and, subsequently, to refer the offenders to the police, the possible recovery of some of
the victims» materials from the perpetrators, and the benefits arising from the sentences following
conviction.
In general, the objectives of bank supervision are to provide a signal to potential offenders
not to commit an offence. In the case where these objectives are met, the supervisor will earn
positive reputation benefits (RBS), which are obtained if, irrespective of the strategies chosen by
the supervisor, the banker decides not to offend. If the banker commits an offence and the
supervisor decides not to supervise, then the crimes may be undetected. However, the banking
system itself may unveil the crime, and in this case, the supervisor will bear negative reputation
(RCS).
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II.2. Stage 2 of the Game: The Banker Vs The Police
If a banker commits an offence and the supervisors decide to supervise, assuming the
supervisors can detect the crime, they are unable to bring the bankers to court directly. The
supervisors have to refer the case to the police and let the police enforce the law. This will be
the stage 2 of the game in which the banker will meet the police. The game is given as follows:
where:
e1 = UOB-COB-DOB-RCB-CBB
e2 = DBP-CEp+RBp
f1 = UOB-COB-CBB +RBB
f2 = FIP-RCp
g1 = UOB-COB-DOB-RCB
g2 = DBP-CEP+RBP
h1 = UOB-COB+RBB
h2 = -RCP
CBB = cost of bribery for banker to avoid punishment.
DBP = direct benefits of enforcing the law, including satisfaction due to enforcement of the
law and bank soundness.
CEP = cost of law enforcement , including, for instance, cost of investigation and of dispatching
police officers to certain areas.
RBP = reputation benefits in achieving objective to enforce the law.
RCP = reputation cost for the police of not achieving their objective.
In this game, the bankers who have been convicted by the supervisor in stage one have
two strategies: try to avoid punishment by bribing the police, or go to court.  On the other
hand, the police have two options: enforce the law (bring the banker to court) or not enforce
the law. The game is assumed to be sequential in which the banker will move first followed by
the police.
BANKIR
Enforce Not Enforce
Bribe e1, e2 f1, f2
Not Bribe g1, g2 h1, h2
 POLICE
Table V.4.
Inspection Games in Bank Supervision, stage 2
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II.3. Game Analysis
Consider q  is the probability that the supervisor will supervise the banker. From the
banker»s perspective, he/she will commit an offence if :
In line with Pradiptyo»s proposition, equation (V.4) shows that the banker will commit an
offence if the net utility to conduct such activity exceeds the expected disutility of direct
punishment and the expected reputation loss.
A similar method is used by the supervisor to decide whether to supervise the banker or
not. Consider p to be the probability of the banker to offend, thus the supervisor will supervise if:
According to equation (V.5), the supervisor will supervise if the net benefit of supervision
exceeds the expected reputation loss.
The game above does not have a pure strategy equilibrium. The mixed strategy equilibrium
is as follows:
(V.4)
(V.5)DBS - CSS  > (-RCS - RBS)p
Since p*, q*  (0,1) it can be inferred that the underlying assumptions of the model are
as follows:
Equations (V.6) and (V.8) imply that in equilibrium, given the net cost of supervision (i.e.,
CSS-DBS), the probability of a banker committing an offence increases (decreases) as the net
benefits of supervision (i.e., RBS+RCS) decrease (increase). To minimize a banker»s chance of
offending we have to improve our appreciation of the supervisor for their supervision of the
bank.The higher our appreciation, the higher the benefits of supervision (i.e., RBS+RCS), thus
the higher the probability that the supervisor will supervise the bank.
Equations (V.7) and (V.9), on the other hand, imply that if the supervisor observes that an
increase in severity of punishment increases either DOB or RCB or both, there is no incentive for
UOB - COB > (DOB + RCB  + RBB)q
p* =
CSS - DBS
RBS + RCS
q* =
UOB - COB
RBB + DOB + RCB
(V.6)
(V.7)
(V.8)RBS  > CSS - RCS  - DBS
(V.9)RBB  > UOB - COB  - DOB - RCB
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the supervisor to increase or to maintain the level of supervision. The increasing severity of
punishment (DOB + RCB) will reduce the probability that the banker will commit an offence, in
addition it will discourage supervisors from increasing or maintaining the level of supervision.
This finding is in line with Tsebelis» and Pradiptyo»s propositions.
At stage two, the banker who has been convicted will play a game with the police. From
the banker»s perspective, the only way to avoid disutility of serving direct punishment (DOB) is
to stop the police from enforcing the law. The banker will move first. Since h1>f1>g1>e1, the
best choice for the banker is to try and bribe the police. If the police accept the bribe, the
banker will evade punishment and retain his/her reputation (f1>e1). However, if the police reject
the bribe and decide to enforce the law, there will be an additional cost of the bribe (CBB) for
the banker (e1<a1). If the banker decides not to bribe the police but, fortunately, the police
choose not to enforce the law, the banker will enjoy all the spoils of his/her offence (h1>a1,
h1=b1).
From a police perspective, when the supervisor has caught the banker and referred the
case, the police can choose whether to prosecute the banker and benefit from enforcing the
law (DBP). The benefits include satisfaction from prosecuting the offender, the possible recovery
of some of the victims» materials from the perpetrator, and the benefits arising from the sentences
following conviction. Enforcing the law, however, is costly and so is delivering sentences.
Supposing that the law has been enforced, regardless of the actions of the bankers, the police
incur the costs of law enforcement (CEP).
Referring to Bowles and Pradiptyo (2004), the objectives of sentences (law enforcement)
are: a) general deterrence√providing a signal to potential offenders not to commit an offence;
b) specific deterrence√deterring re-offending in the future; c) punishment; d) rehabilitation; e)
incapacitation√isolating offenders from the rest of society during their incarceration; and f)
restitution√restoring the losses√incurred by the victims (Bowles and Pradiptyo, 2004). The police
will achieve these objectives only if they enforce the law. If so, the police will earn positive
reputation benefits (RBP). Otherwise, they will bear the negative reputation cost (RCP).
From a police perspective, consider r is the probability that the banker will attempt to
bribe, he/she will enforce the law if :
(V.10)DBP  - CEP - RBP > (FIP) r -  RCP
Equation (V.10) implies that the police will enforce the law if the total net benefit earned
from enforcing the law (DBP-CEP+RBP) exceeds the total expected value of financial incentives
from the bribe (FiP) minus negative reputation (RCP). Through this equation we can see that if
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the net benefit earned from enforcing the law (DBP-CEP+RBP) is small, due to - for instance √less
reputation benefit, the convicted banker will be encouraged to bribe the police. The banker
will try to bribe the police if he or she knows that the net benefit earned by the police by
enforcing the law is limited. Reputation benefit (RBP) is predictable. The lower the reputation
benefit, the smaller the net benefit earned from enforcing the law. Thus, the higher probability
the banker will try to bribe the police.
Bank supervision will be considered effective if it meets its objective, namely deterring
banking crimes. Thus, to measure the effectiveness of bank supervision we need to know the
impact of bank supervision on the possibility of banking crime occurrence (p).  From equation
(4) we can see that given the net utility of committing an offence, the higher the probability q
the lower the probability p. This implies that bank supervision effectively discouraged the banker
from committing an offence (banking crime). It is noteworthy, however, that if society is too
tolerant and, thus, there is no value for reputation, the increasing probability q will not affect
the probability p. Consequently, bank supervision will not be effective in reducing the likelihood
of banking crime. Equation (V.4) also implies that increasing the severity of punishment will
lower the probability p.
 Equation (V.5), on the other hand, reveals that the supervisor will supervise only if the
net benefit of supervision dominates the potential reputation loss. This means that the higher
the reputation values (the bigger the potential reputation loss), the bigger the probability q.
Such assumptions are also supported by equation (V.6) and (V.7), implying that in
equilibrium, given the net cost of supervision (i.e., CSS-DBS), the probability of a banker
committing an offence increases (decreases) as the net benefits of supervision (i.e., RBS+RCS)
decrease (increase). To minimize a banker»s chance of offending we have to improve our
appreciation for the supervisor in achieving adequate bank supervision.The greater our
appreciation, the bigger the benefits of supervision (i.e., RBS+RCS), thus a higher probability
that the supervisor will supervise the bank.
At stage 2, we know that if the net benefits earned from enforcing the law are small,
there is a tendency that the police will accept a bribe from the convicted banker. Since the
banker can predict this result, the banker at stage 1 will consider f1 rather than a1 as his or her
payoff, and it changes equation (V.4) to equation (V.11) as follows:
(V.11)UOB  - COB  > (RBB) q
Equation (V.11) strengthens our previous finding that without reputation value an
increasing probability of q will not affect probability p. Consequently, bank supervision will not
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be effective in reducing the likelihood of banking crime.  Equation (11) also implies that increasing
the severity of punishment will not lower the probability p.
III. SIMULATION RESULT WITH ANALYTICAL NETWORK PROCESS
Using the logic of those games we can build a framework utilizing the analytical network
process approach. Here the story is quite the same. Each player (i.e., the supervisor, the banker
and the police) has their own goal, and for that goal each player will have payoffs as their
criteria and alternatives decisions. Thus, the criteria for the supervisor will be: direct benefits of
supervision (DBS), cost of supervision (CSS), reputation benefits (RBS), and reputation cost (RCS).
Criteria for bankers are: immediate utility from crime (UOB), disutility of direct punishment
(DOB), cost of offense (COB), positive reputation (RBB ), reputation cost (RCB), and cost of bribe
(CBB). While, the police criteria include direct benefits of enforcing the law (DBP), cost of enforcing
the law (CEP), reputation benefits (RBP) and reputation costs (RCP).
The alternative decisions for each player are the same as those used in the game theory
approach. The supervisor will have two alternatives: supervise or not supervise, while the police
will have to choose between enforcing or not enforcing the law. The banker, in the first stage
will have two alternatives, offend or not offend, and at the next stage will have to choose,
bribe or not bribe.
The network can be illustrated as follows:
GOAL
DBs DCs RBs RCs UOB COB RBB RCB DOB CBBB DBP CEP RBP RCP
Supervise NotSupervise Offend
Not
Offend Bribe
Not
Bribe Enforce Enforce
GOAL GOAL
The Supervisor The Banker The Police
Diagram V.2.
Analytic Network Process of Banking Crime
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Referring to the results of the game theory approach, the decisions of one player will
affect and be affected by the other players» decisions. Equation (V.4), for instance, implies that
the decision of a supervisor represented by»q will affect the decision of the banker to offend or
not to offend. While equation (V.5) implies the opposite. Equation (V.10) on the other hand
describes how the police will choose to enforce or not enforce based on the decision of the
banker.
To analyze the effectiveness of bank supervision we need a baseline condition. This
condition can be estimated using Superdecision software based on the network in Figure 6. In
the baseline condition, each player will balance all the criteria, and for each criterion the player
will follow their tendency that is derived in the previous game theory analysis. From a banker»s
point of view, for instance, with respect to the utility of offend (UOB) the banker is likely to
choose offend. This means that offend is equally to moderately (scale 2) more important than
not offend. While, with respect to disutility of offend (DOB), the banker is likely to choose not to
offend, meaning that not to offend is equally to moderately (scale 2) more important than
offend.
Employing all tendencies derived from the game theory analysis to all criteria for all players,
including the relationship between decisions, we will have baseline conditions as shown in
Table 1.
Table V.5
Baseline Condition Priorities
Bribe 0.072029 0.66667
not bribe 0.036014 0.33333
not offend 0.202881 0.48424
Offend 0.216086 0.51576
Enforce 0.048019 0.44444
not enforce 0.060024 0.55556
not supervise 0.199280 0.54605
Supervise 0.165666 0.45395
Alternative Decisions Limiting Normalized
Source: Super Decision's output
It is shown in Table 1 that under the baseline scenario the supervisor is likely to choose
not to supervise, the police may decide not to enforce the law and, accordingly, the banker will
tend to offend. It should be noted, however, that this result is because the decision-making
processes of all players are linked. A different outcome may occur if the processes are separated.
In that case, the supervisor will choose to supervise, the police may decide to enforce and the
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banker is likely not to offend. The interesting finding here is that the preference of one player
changes after they consider the decisions of the other players.
III.1. Scenario 1: Strengthen Bank Supervision
To strengthen bank supervision we need to improve the value of criteria assumed to
encourage supervisors to act. These criteria are the Direct Benefits of Supervision (DBS) and
Reputation Benefit (RBS). Therefore, with respect to the supervisor»s objective, the Direct Benefit
of Supervision (DBS) and Reputation Benefit (RBS) are more significant than other criteria.
Furthermore, with respect to these criteria, we improve the supervisor»s tendency to supervise.
The results are presented in Table V.6.
Table V.6
Priorities of Scenario 1
Bribe 0.073859 0.66667
not bribe 0.036929 0.33333
not offend 0.195334 0.46853
Offend 0.221576 0.53147
Enforce 0.049239 0.44444
not enforce 0.061549 0.55556
not supervise 0.195874 0.54181
Supervise 0.165641 0.45819
Alternative Decisions Limiting Normalized
Source: Super Decision»s output
The result of this scenario is surprising. There are no fundamental changes regarding the
priorities; the supervisor is still likely to choose not to supervise, the police still decide not to
enforce the law and the banker tends to offend. This implies that strengthening bank supervision
will not be effective in deterring banking crimes. This result provides a counter intuitive outcome
to the game theory approach. Any changes in the supervisor»s utility to supervise (DBS and RBS)
do not effect the equilibrium of probability of offending. More intensive banking supervision
does not lower the probability of banking crime.
III.2. Scenario 2: Strengthen Bank Supervision and Increase The Severity of
Punishment
In this scenario, besides strengthening bank supervision we also increase the severity of
punishment. We combine two policies: 1) increasing the disutility of punishment (DOB), and 2)
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increasing the loss of offenders» reputation benefits (RCB). In the model we improve the value
of these criteria to become more significant than the other criteria, and in addition we enhance
the banker»s tendency not to offend. The results of this scenario are presented in Table V.7.
Table V.7
Priorities of Scenario 2
Bribe 0.069914 0.66667
not bribe 0.034957 0.33333
not offend 0.211606 0.50221
Offend 0.209741 0.49779
Enforce 0.046609 0.44445
not enforce 0.058261 0.55555
not supervise 0.178745 0.48452
Supervise 0.190166 0.51548
Alternative Decisions Limiting Normalized
Source: Super Decision»s output
The results of scenario 2 are interesting. Table V.7 shows that there are critical improvements
regarding the priorities. The probability that a supervisor will supervise increases and the banker
may decide not to offend.  The police, however, are still likely to choose not to enforce the law.
This finding implies that strengthening bank supervision coupled with increasing the severity of
punishment will be effective in deterring banking crimes.
III.3. Scenario 3: Strengthen Bank Supervision and Law Enforcement,
Increase Severity of Punishment
In this scenario, we improve not only banking supervision and the severity of punishment
but also law enforcement. There are two ways to enhance law enforcement, namely: 1) increase
the Direct Benefits of law enforcement (DBP), and 2) increase the police Reputation Benefits
(RCP). In the model we improved the value of these criteria to become more significant than the
other criteria and, in addition, we improved the tendency of the police to enforce the law.
The results of Scenario 3 as shown in Table V.4 are very interesting. Increasing law
enforcement indeed reduces the probability a banker will offend. This policy, however, not only
influences the banker»s decision but also the supervisor»s. It may discourage the supervisor from
supervising the bank and also reduce the effectiveness of the policy in deterring banking crimes.
This finding implies that to make law enforcement policy effective, supervisors must continue
to focus on their objective and not be affected by the banker»s decision.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It has been shown in this study using both the game theory and Analytical Network
Process (ANP) approach that each player in decision-making process is influenced by the other
players. A player will make a decision not only based on its payoffs or criteria but also on the
alternative decisions taken by the other players. This finding supports Tsebelis» argument that
the interaction of agents in criminal justice is better analyzed using game theory.
In the analysis of banking crime there are three players and at least two stages of analysis.
The players are the banker, the supervisor and the police √ or criminal justice authority. The two
stages of analysis are: 1) the banker versus the supervisor, and 2) the banker versus the police.
Since there are two stages, predicting the results of the second stage will affect the decision-
making process in stage one. If the banker is certain that the police will accept the bribe offered
in stage two, the banker will consider different payoffs in stage one. Consequently, the results
of the analysis will change considerably.
Although game theory and the analytical network process approach reach the same
conclusion on the interaction of agents in banking crime analysis, the two approaches, however,
actually revealed differing results. With regard the effectiveness of banking supervision, game
theory approach concludes that bank supervision will effectively discourage a banker from
committing an offence. Conversely, the Analytical Network Process shows that bank supervision
alone is ineffective in influencing a banker»s decision. If society are overly tolerant and, thus,
there is no real value for reputation and no value for punishment, enhancing bank supervision
will not be effective in discouraging a banker from committing an offence.
Table V.8
Priorities of Scenario 3
Bribe 0.069045 0.66667
not bribe 0.034522 0.33333
not offend 0.21519 0.50954
Offend 0.207135 0.49046
Enforce 0.057537 0.55555
not enforce 0.04603 0.44445
not supervise 0.196202 0.5295
Supervise 0.174339 0.4705
Alternative Decisions Limiting Normalized
Source: Super Decision»s output
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